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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES SURVEY
INTRODUCTION

Oil, gas and coal production drives the development of natural resources law in the Tenth Circuit. In Doheny v. Wexpro Co.,' the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ruled balancing in-kind is
the preferred remedy for production imbalances on gas wells subject to
joint operating agreements. In Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. v. United
States,2 The Tenth Circuit clarified the Secretary of the Interior's fiduciary duty to Indians in the approval of oil and gas leases. Both cases
demonstrate that the court promotes mineral production when developing natural resources law. This Survey analyzes Doheny and concludes
the court's decision wisely favors producers who deliver gas to the marketplace. The Survey also analyzes how the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes case
will impact mineral leasing on Indian Lands. Finally, part III discusses
standing doctrine as a procedural hurdle for parties objecting to ex3
changes of federal coal lands in the cases of State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan
4
and Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan.
I.

OIL AND GAS

Gas Balancing Remedies in the Absence of a Balancing Agreement: Doheny v. Wexpro Co. 5
A. Background
Gas balancing arises in the production and marketing of natural gas
and is a generic term for a class of various remedies used to offset production imbalances. Multiple parties often have a right to a partial share
of gas production from a single well, lease or unitized area. 6 These parties become co-lessees in the specified area. Gas imbalances occur when
a mineral co-lessee sells gas from the co-owned lease while another colessee with a right to a share of the production does not sell. Simply
stated, "an imbalance occurs if someone who has a right to a portion of
7
that stream does not take that portion."1
Numerous factors cause gas imbalances. A natural gas pipeline
company may refuse to purchase gas from one or more of the unit lessees due to failure of the gas market, 8 or may employ discriminatory
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6. Patrick H. Martin, The Gas Balancing Agreement: What, When, Why, and How, 36
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 13.01, at 13-3 (1990).

7. Id. § 13.02, at 13-8.
8. Edel F. Blanks, III et al., A Primer On Gas Balancing, 37 Loy. L. REV. 831, 833
(1992).
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purchase practices against certain unit operators. 9 A working interest
owner may refuse to sell natural gas at current market value in hopes of
negotiating a future higher price.' 0 The pipeline company may experience mechanical and engineering difficulties that prevent or delay connection to the production facility."I
When a party sells more than his share of the production, he has
"overproduced," while the non-selling party has "underproduced."' 2
If the parties own gas in common, as in a cotenancy, they owe a duty to
account to one another for sale of the common gas. The failure to fulfill
the duty is a failure to account, not a gas imbalance.' 3 Conversely, gas
balancing necessarily presupposes both a right to a definite share of the
gas and a failure to take the gas actually produced. 14 In essence, gas
balancing is the process by which overproduced and underproduced
parties balance their respective shares of ownership to the produced gas
15
by adjusting their take of future gas or through cash payments.
Gas balancing problems arise when parties to a joint operating
agreement fail to take gas in proportion to their ownership interest.
Often the joint operating agreement does not include a balancing agreement. 16 When a dispute arises from a production imbalance in the absence of a formal balancing agreement, parties must agree on an
acceptable balancing method. Principal methods are balancing in-kind,
cash balancing and combined in-kind and cash balancing. 1 7 In-kind balancing allows the underproduced party to take a share of the overproduced party's gas until the parties are balanced.' S Cash balancing
requires the overproduced party to pay the underproduced party periodically or upon depletion of the gas-bearing formation until the pro9. Eugene Kuntz, Gas Balancing Rights and Remedies in the Absence of a Balancing Agreement, 35 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 13-01, at 13-3 (1990).
10. Martin, supra note 6, § 13.02, at 13-8.
11. Id.
12. Blanks et al., supra note 8, at 833.
13. Martin, supra note 6, § 13.02, at 13-10.
The "production imbalance" approach is to be distinguished from a "true
cotenancy" approach and from a "capture" approach. These two latter approaches have been urged on the courts. The "true cotenancy" approach postulates an ownership right in every molecule of gas, and any sale of the gas stream
inures to the benefit or detriment of every party with an ownership interest. Failure to account for the value realized by a selling party would be keeping money
that belongs to others. Such an approach must reject the idea that any party has a
right to take a share in kind because everyone shares an ownership right in each
and every molecule.
Id. § 13.02, at 13-8 to 13-9.
14. Id. § 13.02, at 13-9.
15. 8 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 84
(1992).
16. Gas production often occurs under an A.A.P.L. Model Form Operating Agreement. However, most model joint operating agreements do not contain balancing agreement provisions, which leads to balancing disputes between overproduced and
underproduced co-lessees. David E. Pierce, Taking Gas In Kind Absent a BalancingAgreement,
in THE OIL AND GAS JOINT OPERATING AGREEMENT pt. 9, at 9-1 (Mineral Law Series No. 2,

1990).
17. Blanks et al., supra note 8, at 838.
18. Id.; Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064, 1066-67 (5th Cir.
1990); Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Okla. Ct. App. 1975).
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duction imbalance is remedied. 19 The payment amount is usually based
on the price the overproducing party received. 20 Disputes are commonly complicated by actual market price and the price the underproduced party would have received had she sold her gas. 2 1 Finally,
under combined in-kind and cash balancing, the underproduced party
time
receives in-kind balancing until the reservoir is depleted, at which 22
the overproduced party must pay the outstanding balance in cash.
The attention to gas balancing in secondary authorities disproportionately outweighs case law on the subject. 23 Few cases lend definition
to the doctrine of gas balancing; however, courts tend to agree on basic
issues. Generally, courts to address the issue agree balancing in-kind is
the preferred balancing remedy. 24 However, the courts willingly impose
cash balancing where equities suggest balancing in-kind would detriment one of the parties. This usually arises when the overproduced
party depleted the gas reservoir beyond the capacity to remedy the imbalance in-kind or the underproduced party is unable to accept delivery
as an
of the gas. 25 Courts do not consider a current low market price
26
equity requiring cash balancing for an underproduced party.
B.

Tenth Circuit Opinion

In Doheny v. Wexpro Co., 27 the Tenth Circuit ruled that, unless conditions suggest otherwise, balancing in-kind is the preferred remedy to
19. See, e.g., Kaiser-Francis Oil Co. v. Producer's Gas Co., 870 F.2d 563, 569 (10th Cir.
1989); WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 15, at 85.
20. Kaiser-Francis, 870 F.2d at 569.
21. Blanks et al., supra note 8, at 838.
22. Id.
23. Martin, supra note 6, at 13-14 n.l (citing numerous articles on gas balancing). See
also 1 BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION
§ 19.05, at 19-119 to 19-135 (3d ed. 1992) (gas balancing in the context of pooling and
unitization); 6 HOWARD R. WILLIAMS & CHARLES J. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 951 (1992)

(comprehensive background of pooling and unitization relevant to balancing remedies);
Theodore R. Borrego, Gas BalancingAgreements Selected Problems and Issues, 40 INST. ON OIL &
GAS L. & TAX'N 4-1 (1989) (analysis and model gas balancing agreement); Bert L. Campbell, Gas BalancingAgreements, in OIL AND GAS AGREEMENTS pt. 9 (Mineral Law Series 1983)
(sample gas balancing agreement and commentary); Haywood H. Hillyer, Problems in Producing and Selling, By Split or Single Stream, Gas Allocable to Diverse Working Interest Ownerships,
16 INST. ON OIL & GAS L. & TAX'N 243, 263-66 (1965) (detailed discussion of balancing inkind); David L. Motloch, Form 6 Gas BalancingAgreement, in THE OIL AND GASJOINT OPERAT-

ING AGREEMENT pt. 10 (Mineral Law Series No. 2, 1990) (discussing provisions of model
gas balancing agreement); Thomas W. Niebrugge, Oil and Gas: Production Imbalance in Split
Stream Gas WellsGetting Your FairShare, 30 OKLA. L. REV. 955 (1977) (practical suggestions
regarding problems encountered in gas balancing); Ernest E. Smith, Gas Marketing By CoOwners: DisproportionateSales, Gas Imbalances and Lessors' Claims to Royalty, 39 BAYLOR L. REV.
365 (1987) (contemporary gas marketing realities cause sales out of proportion to owner-

ship interest thereby requiring gas balancing); Claude Upchurch, Split Stream Gas Sales and
the Gas Storage and Balancing Agreement, 24 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 665 (1978) (multiple
interest owners and increased production necessitate gas balancing).
24. Pogo Producing Co., 898 F.2d at 1067; United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Premier Resources, Ltd., 511 F. Supp. 127, 131 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Beren, 546 P.2d at 1359.
25. See Pogo Producing, 898 F.2d at 1067; United Petroleum, 511 F. Supp. at 131; Beren,
546 P.2d at 1360.
26. Pogo Producing, 898 F.2d at 1067.
27. 974 F.2d 130 (10th Cir. 1992).
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correct gas production imbalances in the absence of a formal gas balancing agreement.2 8 Plaintiff-appellant Doheny sought review of an adverse district court ruling granting summary judgment to the
29
defendants. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court on all counts.
Doheny (among others) was an interest holder in oil and gas leases
in Sweetwater, Wyoming, referred to as the Trail Unit. Defendants were
Wexpro, the gas well operator; Questar Pipeline Company, owner of the
pipeline connected to the well; and Celsius Energy Company, BHP Petroleum and Mountain Fuel Supply Company, all three divided interest
owners. 30 In 1958, Doheny entered a unit operating agreement with
defendants to produce gas at the Trail Unit. 3 ' In 1987, Doheny entered
a gas purchase agreement with Questar Pipeline Company's predecessor
that allowed annual renegotiation of the gas purchase price, or contract
cancellation if the parties could not agree on the price. In the summer
of 1989, Doheny and Questar terminated the contract after failing to
renegotiate the price.3 2 After ceasing production during the summer,
Wexpro resumed production for the other Trail Unit owners in the fall
of 1989. All other Trail Unit interest owners except Doheny had contracts to sell their gas. Wexpro kept daily production records detailing
the extent of Doheny's underproduction and the other interest owners'
33
overproduction.
Questar informed Doheny it would transport the plaintiffs' gas if
Doheny could locate another purchaser. Wexpro subsequently provided plaintiffs with a list of seven regional natural gas marketers. However, Doheny failed to sell his gas. 3 4 Doheny maintained the cost of
transporting gas through Questar's pipeline rendered any sales to third
35
parties economically infeasible.
Doheny filed suit against Wexpro, Questar and the other interest
owners in June, 1990, in United States District Court for the District of
Wyoming. 36 The complaint stated he was entitled to cash balancing to
remedy his underproduction in the Trail Unit based on his cotenancy
relationship with the other interest owners and Wexpro's fiduciary duties as operator.3 7 On summary judgment motions, the district court
ruled the proper remedy was balancing in-kind as opposed to cash balancing. 3 8 The lower court further ruled that the unit operating agree28. Id. at 134.
29. Id. at 135.
30. Id. at 131-32. Plaintiffs' minority interest in the Trail Unit well constituted an
8.2831% interest. Defendants' working interests were, respectively: Celsius Energy Company, 3.5529%; BHP Petroleum, Inc., 46.12099%; and Mountain Fuel Supply Company,
42.04301%.
31. Id. at 132. See the definition of unit operating agreement, infra notes 73-76 and
accompanying text.
32. Doheny, 974 F.2d at 132.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 132-33.
35. Id

36. Id at 132.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 132-33.
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ment did not create a cotenancy relationship, and Wexpro did not owe a
fiduciary duty to Doheny requiring the operator to obtain a balancing
agreement upon termination of plaintiff's purchase contract.39
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit ruled that balancing in-kind is the preferred method of the oil and gas industry unless circumstances indicate
otherwise. 40 The court stated conditions requiring cash balancing are
depletion of the well by the overproducer and physical inability of the
underproduced party to accept gas in-kind, neither of which were present in this factual situation. 4 1 While the court recognized Doheny's
valid interest in obtaining a favorable price for his gas, the court ruled
such market price considerations do not justify imposing cash balancing
42
on the overproducers.
The court noted several policy considerations favoring balancing
in-kind over cash balancing. Underproduced parties may be forced to
sell their gas at a price they deem unacceptable if cash balancing is "universally and automatically applied."143 Additionally, if after the fact interest owners could elect cash balancing over balancing in-kind, such
discretionary license would foster speculation. Producers would choose
to "take in-kind in a rising price market and to take the cash in a declin'44
ing market."
Based on a several liability clause and language referring to the
interest owners' separate shares of production in the unit operating
agreement, the Tenth Circuit ruled the working interest of the Trail
Unit owners was not a cotenancy. 45 The lack of a cotenancy relationship
among the interest owners foreclosed the remedy of a cash
46
accounting.
Doheny argued unsuccessfully before the district court that Wexpro's contract obligations created a fiduciary duty requiring the operating company to shut down production at the Trail Unit well until a gas
balancing agreement was acquired once Doheny terminated his
purchase agreement with Questar. 4 7 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
lower court and stated that based on elementary contract principles, no
such fiduciary duty arose on Wexpro's part unless specifically set forth in
the operating agreement. 48 Accordingly, Wexpro did not breach the
contract since the contract contained no specific provision requiring
Wexpro to obtain a gas balancing agreement on behalf of Doheny.4 9
39. Id.
40. Id. at 133 (citing Pogo Producing Co. v. Shell Offshore, Inc., 898 F.2d 1064, 1067
(5th Cir. 1990); United Petroleum Exploration, Inc. v. Premier Resources, Ltd., 511 F.
Supp. 127, 131 (W.D. Okla. 1980); Beren v. Harper Oil Co., 546 P.2d 1356, 1359 (Okla.
Ct. App. 1975)).
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Pogo Producing, 898 F.2d at 1067).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 133-34.
45. Id. at 134.
46. See supra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
47. Doheny, 974 F.2d at 134-35.
48. Id. at 135.
49. Id.
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Analysis

The Tenth Circuit's decision in Doheny recognized that in the absence of a balancing agreement, an underproducer may not pursue the
most favorable economic remedy to the detriment of other working interest owners. In a sense, underproduced parties must accept gas inkind to balance production because they failed to negotiate a favorable
purchase contract with a pipeline company or other third-party buyer.
Cash balancing too often provides a windfall for the non-diligent underproducer. 50 Balancing in-kind awards underproduced interest owners
exactly what they are due: gas.
Cash balancing is most equitable when the underproduced party
bears little or no responsibility for the imbalance. An overproducer who
depletes the reservoir of natural gas to the detriment of other interest
owners is literally unable to remedy the imbalance in-kind. A cash payment immediately and efficiently balances the account and penalizes the
overproducing party for drinking too deeply at the well. Underproduced parties who cannot accept gas in-kind should receive cash to
balance their underproduction only if they bear little culpability for the
imbalance.
As the Tenth Circuit demonstrated, courts should guard against the
inequities poised in the shadows of gas balancing remedies. An underproduced party may request balancing in-kind in a rising market and
cash balancing when the market price of natural gas falls. 5 1 The overproduced party will favor the opposite remedy. Courts should disfavor
such predatory opportunistic approaches by either party to balancing
remedies, but should defer in favor of the overproducer in order to encourage production.
Balancing in-kind rightly favors the overproducer. While circumstances exist in which an underproducer would favor balancing in-kind
over cash, the diligent overproducer is accountable to other interest
owners in gas, not market price. An overproducer forced to balance in
cash as a matter of uniform principle bears the burden of market variations more than the underproducer. The overproducer's success in negotiating favorable purchase contracts or diligently seeking untapped
markets is distributed among the less diligent, less guarded underproducers who have failed to successfully market their gas. Cash balancing encourages a group of interest owners to unfairly profit from the
success of any one co-interest owner without risking their own gas in the
vagaries of the marketplace.
As a central tenet, oil and gas law favors production. In allocating
benefit among producers, courts favor the party delivering gas to the
marketplace. If underproducers could obtain either remedy at their discretion, underproducers would ride the slipstream of the successful
overproducer who sells his gas at a high market price, or conversely de50. Id. at 133-34.

51. Id.
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mand gas in-kind for past imbalances in a market of climbing natural gas
price. Setting forth balancing in-kind as the standard remedy for production imbalances places the risk of loss disproportionately on the underproducer and the opportunity for advantage on the overproducer in
order to favor production.
Parties to joint operating agreements should include a gas balancing agreement. Expense and disputes arising in the absence of a formal
balancing agreement are avoided through careful selection of gas balancing remedies at the onset of ajoint operating agreement. Obviously,
parties who understand the inherent advantages of various balancing
methods may employ them to their respective benefit at the contract
52
negotiation stage.
II.

53
INDIAN LAW

Fiduciary Duty of the Secretary of the Interior: Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of
52. For an excellent account of the provisions in a model gas balancing agreement,
see Motloch, supra note 23.
53. Cases decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1992 demonstrate that the court continues
to develop Indian law. In addition to the Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. case which is the
subject of this portion of this survey, the Tenth Circuit decided several other cases
involving Indian law. However, these decisions are less significant since they involve wellsettled areas of Indian law such as the immunity of Indians from state taxing authorities
and the sovereign immunity of tribal businesses from litigation in federal courts.
The Tenth Circuit decided two cases concerning Indian immunity from state taxing
authorities: Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. v. Oklahoma Tax Comm'n,
969 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1992) (Indian tribe not immune from legal obligation to collect
state tax on sales of cigarettes to non-tribal members on reservation; however, sovereign
immunity bars federal court enforcement action) and; Sac & Fox Nation v. Oklahoma Tax
Comm'n, 967 F.2d 1425 (10th Cir. 1992) (state tax authority could collect income tax from
non-member employees of tribe but lacked authority to collect taxes from tribal members
employed by tribe).
According to settled Indian law, tribes are immune from state tax authorities. See
generally California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987) (State of
California may tax Indians on Tribal lands only if Congress consents); Montana v.
Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759 (1985) (State of Montana may not tax royalty
interest of Indian tribe from mineral development on tribal lands); Moe v. Confederated
Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (State of Montana
cigarette sales tax and personal property tax on automobiles invalid as applied to Indians
on reservation); McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)
(State of Arizona lacked jurisdiction to tax income of Navajo Indians residing on the
Navajo Reservation whose income was wholly derived from reservation sources); FELIX S.
COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 254-55 (1986) (overview of limitations on state
taxing authorities regarding Indian tribes); JAY VINCENT WHITE, TAXING THOSE THEY
FOUND HERE 33-52 (1972) (legal history of federal instrumentality doctrine prohibiting
state taxation of lands held in trust); CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND
THE LAw 96-99 (1987) (analysis of case law construing immunity of tribes from state
taxation); Clydia J. Cuykendall, Recent Development, 49 WASH. L. REv. 191 (1973)
(federal preemption of taxation analyzed in light of Indian sovereign immunity).
The Tenth Circuit also decided two cases that support the well-founded doctrine that
Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity: Bank of Okla. v. Muscogee (Creek) Nation, 972
F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1992) (tribal sovereign immunity bars'federal court interpleader
.action against tribal business); Citizen Band, 969 F.2d at 943 (tribal sovereign immunity
bars enforcement in federal court of tribal obligation to collect state tax on sales of
cigarettes to nontrbal members on reservation).
It is a well-settled doctrine of Indian law that tribes enjoy sovereign immunity. See
generally Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498
U.S. 505 (1991) (Indian tribe immune from state taxes on cigarette sales on reservation);
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The Supreme Court first recognized the existence of a trust relationship between the federal government and Indian tribes in early decisions interpreting treaties. 55 The United States entered hundreds of
treaties with tribes between 1787 and 1871 in which the tribes gave up
land in exchange for promises from the government. 5 6 Generally, the
treaties promised that the federal government would create permanent
reservations for the tribes and protect and safeguard the health and
57
well-being of the Indians.
Chief Justice Marshall provided a conceptual basis for the trust between Indian tribes and the government by describing the relationship
in guardian-ward terms. Indian tribes are in a state of pupilage. Their
relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian. 58
Half a century later, the Court recognized that treaties with Indian tribes
promised protection by the federal government and thereby created a
formal fiduciary relationship. 59 The basis for the fiduciary relationship
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980)
(State of Washington may tax sale of cigarettes to non-tribal members on reservation, but
tribal sovereign immunity bars state taxation of sales to tribal members), reh g denied, 448
U.S. 911 (1981); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (tribal sovereign
immunity barred suit in federal court against Indian tribe by tribal member under Indian
Civil Rights Act); Tillett v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 636 (10th Cir. 1991) (tribal sovereign immunity
requires exhaustion of tribal court remedies before pursuit of suit against tribal member in
federal court); Superior Oil Co. v. United States, 798 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1986) (tribal
sovereign immunity requires exhaustion of tribal court remedies before oil company may
instigate suit against tribe in federal court); VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, THE
NATIONS WITHIN: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY (1984)
(excellent political and social history of tribal sovereign immunity); GEORGE S. GROSSMAN,
THE SOVEREIGNTY OF AMERICAN INDIAN TRIBES: A MATrER OF LEGAL HISTORY (Matthew
Stark ed., 1979) (concise summary of Indian sovereign immunity); Ralph W. Johnson &

James M. Madden, Sovereign Immunity in Indian Tribal Law, 12 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 153
(1984) (detailed summary of statutory and case law regarding tribal sovereign immunity);
Frederick J. Martone, American Indian Tribal Self-Government in the Federal System: Inherent
Right or CongressionalLicense?, 51 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 600 (1976) (arguing status of Indian
tribes is based on federal preemption of state law, not true sovereign immunity); Steve E.
Dietrich, Comment, Tribal Businesses and the Uncertain Reach of Tribal Sovereign Immunity: A
Statutory Solution, 67 WASH. L. REV. 113 (1992) (statutory remedy proposed to alleviate
problems sovereign immunity creates for commercial tribal ventures).

54.
55.
30 U.S.
56.
57.

966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992).
See, e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
1 (1831).
See COHEN, supra note 53, at 46-66.
STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 38 (2d ed. 1992).

58. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
59. These Indian tribes are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent
for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States, and receive from
them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where
they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and
helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government
with them and the treaties in which it has been promised, there arises the duty of
protection, and with it the power. This has always been recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen.
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383-84 (1886)(upholding congressional power to
confer federal jurisdiction over crimes committed on Indian reservations); see also United
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is literally trust: the tribes trust the United States to fulfill its treaty obligations given in exchange for Indian lands. 60 While the general duties
arising out of a treaty require the United States to meet the rigorous
standards of a fiduciary, 6 1 treaty obligations lack specificity in areas of
narrow subject matters such as natural resources development.
In addition to treaty-based fiduciary responsibilities, the Supreme
Court has held the federal government acts as a fiduciary to Indians on
statutory and regulatory grounds. Federal statutory law creates a fiduciary relationship in the same manner as a treaty. Express statutory language requires the United States to regulate, control or protect Indian
natural resources and lands for tribal benefit and imposes specific duties
and trust obligations on the federal government. 6 2 Where courts base
fiduciary obligations on subject matters regulated by statutory schemes,
63
the government must act with a high degree of care and responsibility.
The more pervasive and encompassing the federal agency regulation
and control of Indian resources, the greater the trust responsibility. 64
Where a federal agency as trustee mismanages tribal resources and injures the tribe as beneficiary, the trust relationship necessarily permits
States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913)(recognizing that congressional legislation prohibiting alcohol on Indian reservation is validly based on government's guardianship over
Indians).
60. For additional background on the trust relationship doctrine, see generally CoHEN, supra note 53, at 169-73 (trustee/beneficiary aspects of "wardship" status of Indians);
Nancy Carol Carter, Race and Power Poltics as Aspects of Federal Guardianship Over American
Indians: Land Related Cases, 1887-1924, 4 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 197 (1976) (survey of Indian
lands cases over 50-year period recognizing federal fiduciary duty to tribes); Reid Peyton
Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV.
1213 (1975) (congressional statutory intent mandates executive branch act as trustee to
Indian tribes).
61. In 1942, in an action for breach of fiduciary duties arising from treaty obligations,
the Supreme Court cited numerous prior decisions and described in moral terms the nature of the fiduciary relationship:
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the Government is
something more than a mere contracting party. Under a humane and self-imposed policy.., it has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and trust. Its conduct, as disclosed in the acts of those who represent it in
dealings with the Indians, should therefore be judged by the most exacting fiduciary standards.
Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296-97 (1942).
Although fiduciary obligations elude concise summary, fiduciaries must act selflessly
in their wards' best interest, and give them the benefit of special knowledge, skill and
expertise. Courts demand fiduciaries to act in good faith and avoid self-dealing and conflicts of interest. See, e.g., Austin W. Scott, The FiduciaryPrinciple, 37 CAL. L. REv. 539, 53945 (1949)(well-written exposition of fiduciary principles applicable to range of
relationships).
62. The Secretary of the Interior is authorized to manage timber sales, oil and gas
development and mineral leasing on Indian lands. 25 U.S.C. § § 391-416 (1988 & Supp. II
1991). See United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983)(statutes and regulations requiring the United States to manage Indian timber resources for tribal benefit creates common
law trust that renders government liable in damages for breach of fiduciary duties).
63. Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 206; Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 782 F.2d
855 (10th Cir. 1986)(en banc), adopting in relevant part, Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron
Energy Corp., 728 F.2d 1555, 1563-73 (10th Cir. 1984)(Seymour, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 970 (1986).
64. See, e.g., Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 224-25; Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624
F.2d 981, 986 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
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the tribe to sue the trustee agency for damages resulting from the
65
breach of fiduciary obligations.
Tribal entities aggrieved by agency action may sue under provisions
of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief.6 6 , Generally, federal courts will set aside only that
agency action that is arbitrary and capricious, or not in accordance with
the law. Under principles of administrative law, an agency must consider relevant factors and consequences regarding its administrative decision and support the action with an administrative record that
ventilates the major issues of policy and fact. Although courts defer to
agencies upon judicial review, the administrative record must demonstrate the agency weighed-the facts and alternatives and based its action
67
on reasonable conclusions.
B.

Tenth Circuit Opinion

In Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes of Okla. v. United States, 6 8 the Tenth Circuit
recognized that fiduciary duties constrain the Secretary of the Interior's
(Secretary) discretion to approve oil and gas leases on tribal lands. The
court ruled that the Secretary breached his duties as a fiduciary when he
failed to consider relevant factors, including current market and economic conditions, before approving communitization agreements.69
The court reviewed the district court's summary judgment ruling overturning the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) 1981 decision. The BIA approved two communitization agreements unitizing oil and gas
operations on two spacing units owned by the Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribes of Oklahoma (Tribe) in Custer County, Oklahoma.
Woods Petroleum Company and Reading and Bates Petroleum
Company (Companies) owned a total of six oil and gas leases originally
approved by the BIA on Tribal lands. 70 The lease terms included commence drilling clauses that extended the lease duration if drilling initiated before the leases expired on May 10, 1981. 7 1 The leases also
included unit operating clauses that allowed the parties to communitize
the gas field as one operating unit if adopted by a majority of the operat65. See Mitchell, 463 U.S. at 225 n.31.
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-590 (1988 & Supp. III 1992). See generally PEVAR, supra note 57, at
320-22 (providing discussion ofjudicial review of administrative actions affecting Indians
and tribal entities).
67. See, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971)(record maintained contemporaneous with agency decision-making necessary to survive judicial review when challenged); Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.
1977)(agency action arbitrary and capricious where administrative record failed to disclose
secret and undocumented ex parte contacts between agency and those affected by agency
action), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977); United States v. Nova Scotia Food Products
Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977)(agency regulation void as arbitrary and capricious
where data upon which regulation was based was not publicized and comments of interested parties who submitted contrary evidence went unaddressed in record by agency).
68. 966 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1992).
69. Id. at 589-90.
70. Id. at 584-85.
71. Id. at 585.
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ing interests and approved by the Secretary. 72
Under a communitization agreement, gas production anywhere on a
gas field is deemed to occur on each lease within the communitized
area. 73 Communitization is a synonym for unitization. This term denotes the joint operation of all or a portion of a petroleum reservoir
subject to different ownership interests. 74 Unitization functions as a
conservation measure by which few wells are drilled and operated in the
unitized area in order to prevent waste, maintain reservoir pressures and
best use secondary recovery techniques. 75 Unitization is often the only
manner by which production from numerous tracts overlying a common
76
reservoir is economically feasible.
A communitization agreement in conjunction with the commence
drilling clause would extend the duration of all the leases on the Tribe's
lands if drilling commenced on any single lease within the communitized
area despite the termination date. 77 Three weeks prior to the May 10,
1981, termination date, the Companies decided to communitize the
leases and requested approval from the Tribe. 78 Tribal business representatives met with the Companies and local BIA officials and refused to
approve the communitization agreements unless the leases were renegotiated to provide a $1,500 per acre lease bonus and a ten percent back-in
working interest to the Tribe. 79 The Companies rejected renegotiations
of the leases and threatened litigation unless the Tribe assented to the
communitization agreements. 8 0 On the grounds that the agreements
adequately protected the Tribe's limited interests, the United States
Geological Survey recommended that the BIA approve the communitization agreements. 8 1 On May 8, 1981, just two days before the Companies' leasehold interests in the oil and gas field would expire, the
72. Id. A unit operating clause is the provision in a lease which permits the parties to
enter a unit operating agreement. The latter is defined as "[a]n agreement or plan of
development and operation for the recovery of oil and gas made subject thereto as a single
consolidated unit without regard to separate ownership and for the allocation of costs and
benefits on a basis as defined in the agreement or plan." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
15, at 13.15.
73. See, e.g., Kenai Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Dep't of the Interior, 671 F.2d 383, 384 (10th Cir.
1982). See also WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 15, at 921-24.
74. WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note 15, at 1317-18.

75. Id.
76. See, e.g., KRAMER & MARTIN, supra note 23, § 1.01, at 1-1 to 1-3.
77. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 585.
78. Id
79. Id A lease bonus is broadly defined as "the cash consideration paid by the lessee
for the execution of an oil and gas lease by a landowner." WILLIAMS & MEYERS, supra note
15, at 114. The lease bonus acts as an incentive in unitization negotiations involving reluctant interest owners such as the Tribe. See Charles Nesbitt, A Primer on ForcedPooling of Oil
and Gas in Oklahoma, 50 OKLA. BJ. 648, 650 (1979).
A back-in working interest may, like a lease bonus, induce reluctant owners to consent
to unitization. A back-in working interest allows land-owners to regain a working interest
in a well after it has been proven tobe successful. Accordingly, a back-in working interest
can be significantly more lucrative than a lease bonus. A back-in working interest is often
given as incentive to an operating owner affected by unitization. WILJAMS & MEYERS,
supra note 15, at 81.
80. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 585.
81. Id.
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Acting Area Director of the Anadarko Office of the BIA approved the
communitization agreements.82
The Tribe sought administrative review of the BIA action, 83 and
ultimately filed action against the United States, the BIA and the Department of the Interior in the United States District Court for the Western
District of Oklahoma. The complaint challenged the BIA's authority to
approve the communitization agreements and extend the terms of the
oil and gas leases.8 4 The district court concluded the unit operation
clause in the leases did not require consent from the Tribe in order to
activate the communitization agreements. However, the court held the
Acting Area Director of the BIA breached his fiduciary trust obligations
to the Tribe under statutes regulating Department of Interior mineral
leasing on Indian lands8 5 by approving the communitization agreements
8 6
without first examining prevailing market and economic conditions.
This breach of trust by the Secretary's representative rendered invalid
the communitization agreements regarding the leases on which the
Companies had not commenced drilling. The leases terminated upon
87
expiration of their primary terms.
The Tenth Circuit granted Woods Petroleum Company's petition
for interlocutory appeal and the Tribe's petition for cross-appeal. 8 8 The
court dismissed the Companies' claim that the Tribe's administrative appeal was time barred and pointed out that the administrative appeal was
timely as the regulation at issue 89 required written notice to the Tribe of
the BIA action. 90 Since the Tribe never received written notice of the
BIA approval of the communitization agreements, the Tribe's right to
appeal was never time barred. 9 1
The Companies also maintained the district court considered irrelevant factors in concluding the Secretary was constrained by its fiduciary
duty in the approval of the communitization agreements. 92 The Tenth
Circuit disagreed and outlined the statutory and regulatory framework
that mandates discretionary approval by the Secretary of communitization agreements of oil and gas leases on Indian lands. 9 3 The Mineral
Leasing Act required the Secretary to promulgate rules and regulations
82. Id.
83. In sequence, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of the Interior and
the BIA affirmed the Anadarko Area Director's approval of the communitization agreements. Id. at 586.
84. Id. Due to an insufficient record, the district court remanded the case to the Secretary, whose response to the Order of Remand provoked a round of summary judgment
motions from the parties.
85. Mineral Leasing Act of 1938, 25 U.S.C. §§ 396(a)-(g) (1988)(statutory scheme setting forth Secretary's role in mineral leasing on Indian lands).
86. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 586.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 584.
89. 25 C.F.R. § 2.7(b) (1992)(right to appeal agency action or decision continues until
agency gives written notice).
90. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 587.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 588.
93. Id.
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regarding mineral leasing of Indian lands and directed that the Secre94
tary in his discretion approve reasonable unit operating agreements.
These regulations required the Secretary's approval of cooperative
agreements such as the communitization agreements. 95 The court held
that despite the absence of express statutory or regulatory language, the
Secretary acts as a fiduciary to the Indians, and "the United States' function as a trustee over Indian lands necessarily limits the Secretary's discretion to approve communitization agreements." 9 6 The court affirmed
the principle that whenever the government controls Indian properties
or monies, the United States acts as a fiduciary to the tribe.9 7 Relying
on the Mineral Leasing Act and Department of Interior regulations,
which require Secretary approval of oil and gas leases and communitization agreements, the court stated that a fiduciary relationship arises between the Secretary and the Tribe because of the government's
pervasive role in oil and gas leasing on Indian lands. 9 8
The Secretary's discretion to approve oil and gas leases and communitization agreements is limited by fiduciary standards which necessarily include the duty to maximize lease revenues and safeguard the
economic interests of the Tribe. 9 9 On administrative review, the Secretary's action must meet the demanding standards of a fiduciary, not just
the minimal requirements of administrative review. 10 0 Applying these
standards, the court held that when the BIA originally approved the
communitization agreements, the Acting Area Director failed to consider relevant economic factors, including marketability and market
value of the leases if renegotiated.10 1 Affirming the district court's finding, the Tenth Circuit held the failure to consider economic conditions
was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion and a breach of the
Secretary's fiduciary duties to the Tribe.10 2 Accordingly, the court ruled
the communitization agreements approved by the BIA were invalid and
94. All operations under any oil, gas, or other mineral lease issued pursuant to
the terms of sections 396 a to 3 9 6g of this title or any other Act affecting restricted Indian lands shall be subject to the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Secretary of the Interior. In the discretion of the said Secretary, any lease for
oil or gas issued under the provisions of sections 396a to 396g of this title shall be
made subject to the terms of any reasonable cooperative unit or other plan approved or prescribed by said Secretary prior or subsequent to the issuance of any
such lease which involves the development or production of oil or gas from land
covered by such lease.
Mineral Leasing Act, 25 U.S.C. § 396(d) (1988).
95. All such leases shall be subject to any cooperative or unit development plan
affecting the leased lands that may be required by the Secretary of the Interior,
but no lease shall be included in any cooperative or unit plan without prior approval of the Secretary of the Interior and consent of the Indian tribe affected.
25 C.F.R. § 171.21(b) (1981)(repromulgated at 25 C.F.R. § 211.21(b) (1992)).
96. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, 966 F.2d at 588.
97. Id. at 588 (citing Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981 (1980)).
98. Id. (citing Mitchell v. United States, 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983)).
99. Id. at 589.
100. Id. at 590-91 (citing Jicarilla Apache Tribe v. Supron Energy Corp., 728 F.2d
1555, 1563 (10th Cir. 1984)(Seymour,J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), dissenting opinion adopted as the majority opinion as modified, 782 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1986)).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 591.
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any leases upon which drilling had not commenced by May 10, 1981,
03
terminated on that date.'
C.

Analysis

The Tenth Circuit's decision in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes defines the
role of the Secretary in mineral leasing on Indian Lands. As trustee, the
Secretary must consider all factors in oil and gas leases relevant to the
best interests of the beneficiary Tribe. After Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, failure to consider the Indians' economic interest in aggregate with social,
environmental and conservation factors renders BIA action regarding
mineral leasing both arbitrary and capricious on administrative review
10 4
under the APA and a breach of fiduciary duty.
The BIA may not solely consider the conservation interests inherent in any unitization agreement on Indian lands, but must examine
whether unitization- serves the Tribe's economic interests. If oil and gas
lease values significantly rise, renegotiation of lease terms at higher rates
better serves the Tribe. Despite conservation benefits realized through
unitization of oil and gas fields, the Tenth Circuit decision demonstrates
that economics may trump conservation concerns. Indians aggrieved by
administrative action that constitutes a breach of the trust responsibility
may obtain damages from the agency in addition to injunctive and declaratory relief under the APA. Based on the pervasive role of the Department of the Interior and the BIA in the regulation of mineral leasing
on Indian lands, the fiduciary obligations of the Secretary are rigorous
05
and demanding.'
The Tenth Circuit differentiated between the general trust responsibility arising from treaty obligations and the subject-specific fiduciary
duties arising in the context of mineral leasing supervised by the Secretary under the Mineral Leasing Act and implementing regulations.
Although treaty obligations create a general trust relationship between
the United States and the Indians, obligations based on a statutory and
regulatory framework demand that agencies meet the exacting standards
of a fiduciary at every stage of agency participation. 10 6 After CheyenneArapaho Tribes, agency officials administering mineral development and
production on Indian lands held in trust must seriously consider the
best interest of the Indians regarding the maximum revenue-producing
use of the lands. As fiduciary, the Secretary should treat Tribal mineral
development as an investment under the stewardship of the Department
of the Interior. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes demonstrates a judicial willingness to force the Secretary as common-law fiduciary to justify the revenue produced by specific leases on Tribal mineral lands.
However, the fiduciary standard set forth in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes
is ultimately no more rigorous than that demanded of all agencies under
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
106. Cheyenne-Arapaho Tibes, 966 F.2d at 591.
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the APA and Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 10 7 Upon judicial review, the Secretary may satisfy the fiduciary standard by exhibiting
an administrative record which simply considers the Tribe's economic
interests. Such a record is sufficient to pass scrutiny under Overton Park.
The Secretary simply failed to even consider the Tribe's economic best
interest when the BIA reviewed the communitization agreements.
Although the court framed the Secretary's obligations in substantive fiduciary terms, the net effect is, ultimately like all administrative exercises, procedural. The Secretary's actions would most likely have
withstood legal challenge if the BIA had conducted an exercise in administrative record building that justified how the Tribe's economic best
interests are served by renewing the communitization agreements.
In historical context, the United States has rarely met even the contractual treaty obligations promised Indian tribes. 10 8 Review of administrative action that requires the executive branch to act as a commonlaw fiduciary to the Indians or risk judicial censure appears to demand
the United States to honor obligations long ignored and attempts to
prospectively remedy an historic injustice of appalling proportions. The
fiduciary obligations recognized in Cheyenne-Arapaho Tibes'are, however,
ultimately procedural. Challengers or defenders of BIA action regarding minerals development on Tribal lands should strategize as in any
administrative action under the APA.
III.

PUBLIC LANDS

Standing to Sue When Challenging Public Lands Exchanges: A Procedural Hurdle: State ex rel. Sullivan v. Lujan;1 09 Ash Creek Mining Co. v.
Lujan. 10
A. Background
Article III, § 2, of the Constitution limits the judicial power of federal courts to the resolution of "cases" and "controversies."' II Standing doctrine arises out of the case and controversy limitation on the
scope of judicial authority and serves to ensure that the party seeking
relief has established such a personal interest in the controversy as to
"assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of
issues. ' ' 112 Reduced to the minimum, standing identifies disputes ap107. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
108. See COHEN, supra note 53, at 46-66; PEVAR, supra note 57, at 38.
109. 969 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1992).
110. 969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
111. Article III, § 2, cl. 1 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority;to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls;to all cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;to Controversies between
two or more States;between a State and Citizens of another state;between Citizens of different States;between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
the Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
112. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94, 99 (1968). ChiefJustice Warren explained in Flast:
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propriate to judicial resolution.' 13 Any party seeking relief in federal
court must establish standing in order to challenge the action at issue in
the lawsuit. 114 The Supreme Court recently demonstrated that litigants
5
who ignore standing requirements do so at their peril.' 1
The Supreme Court set forth the constitutional essence of standing
as three elements that a party seeking relief must establish: injury in fact,
causation and redressability. 1 16 First, an injury in fact must be discrete,
concrete, specific and actual or imminent. 1"7 A conjectural or hypothetical injury is insufficient to sustain standing." 8
[I]n terms of Article III limitations on federal court jurisdiction, the question of
standing is related only to whether the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be
presented in an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable of
judicial resolution. It is for that reason that the emphasis in standing problems is
on whether the party invoking federal court jurisdiction has "a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy," and whether the dispute touches upon "the
legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests."
Id at 101 (citations omitted).
113. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990). Standing doctrine has
engendered a vast array of commentary. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTIONAL LAw 78 (2d ed. 1988); 13 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-

§ 3531 (2d ed. 1984)(constitutional foundation of standing doctrine); Roger
Beers, Standing and Related ProceduralHurdles in Environmental Litigation, I J. ENvTL. L. &
LITIG. 65 (1986)(arguing that careful plaintiff selection and exhaustion of administrative
remedies surmount standing difficulties encountered in environmental litigation); Kevin
A. Coyle, Standing of Third Parties To ChallengeAdministrative Agency Actions, 76 CAL. L. REV.
1061 (1988)(causation element of standing doctrine should be abandoned in administrative actions on behalf of third parties); Robert Dugan, Comment, Standing To Sue: A Commentay on Injury in Fact, 22 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 256, 257 (197 1)(maintaining injury in fact
is the primary element of the tripartite standing test); William A. Fletcher, The Structure of
Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988); Maria E. Mansfield, Standing and Ripeness Revisited: The
Supreme Court's "Hypothetical" Bamers, 68 N.D. L. REV. 1 (1992); Gene R. Nichol,Jr., Abusing
Standing: A Comment on Allen v. Wright, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 635 (1985)(Supreme Court
concern with separation of powers evinced in standing opinions furthers agenda ofjudicial
activism); Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984)(less confusing
and obfuscated standing doctrine provides better access to federal courts for deserving
claimants); Jonathan Poisner, Environmental Values andJudicial Review After Lujan: Two Critiques of the Separation of Powers Theory of Standing, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 335 (1991); Antonin
Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.
L. REV. 881 (1983)(arguing standing is a central and indispensable tenet of the principle of
separation of powers); Kurt S. Kusiak, Note, Standing to Sue. A Brief Review of Current Standing Doctrine, 71 B.U. L. REV. 667 (1991); Stu Stuller, Note, Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 933 (1991)(current standing doctrine requires environmental
litigants to meet same standing requirements as other public interest litigants).
114. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). The party seeking review in federal
court bears the burden of demonstrating standing elements. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas,
493 U.S. 215, 231 (1990); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975).
115. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130 (1992) (environmental group
plaintiffs failed to establish that any of their members would be directly injured by federal
funding of projects in other countries adverse to endangered species); Lujan v. National
Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (environmental group which challenged Bureau of
Land Management land withdrawal program did not aver sufficient injury in fact to support standing under the APA where plaintiffs merely used lands in vicinity of mining
activities).
116. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136.
117. Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)(citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461
U.S. 95 (1983)).
118. Glover River Org. v. United States Dep't of Interior, 675 F.2d 251, 254 (10th Cir.
1982)(citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974)).
CEDURE
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The party seeking judicial relief must demonstrate a definite and
recognizable injury to itself' 1 9 to satisfy the injury in fact element of
standing. Accordingly, the injury must affect the individual in a personal
and particularized way. 120 Second, the injury must have a causal connection to the action challenged in the lawsuit. 12 1 Stated another way,
the claimed injury must result from the defendant's actions, and not the
result of "the independent action of some third party not before the
court." 12 2 Third, redressability is the relation of the injury to the
court's remedial and equitable powers. It must be likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. 123 The plaintiff's requested relief must remedy the claimed injury.
When a party challenges government action or inaction in federal
court, standing depends on whether the plaintiff is the object of the asserted action or inaction. 124 When the plaintiff is the direct object of the
government action or inaction, both the causation and redressability elements of standing are usually satisfied. 125 However, when a party's
claimed injury arises from the government's regulation or alleged unlawful regulation of another party, the causation and redressability elements of standing are more attenuated. 12 6 Challenging government
action or inaction regarding a third party is therefore substantially more
27
difficult to establish.'
B.

Tenth Circuit Opinions

In two cases arising from an exchange of federal coal for a conservation easement in Grand Teton National Park, Wyoming, the Tenth Circuit ruled both the State of Wyoming and the Ash Creek Mining
Company lacked standing to challenge the Secretary of the Department
of the Interior's (Secretary) action. In both State ex rel. Sullivan 128 and
Ash Creek Mining Co., 1 29 the State of Wyoming (State) and Ash Creek
Mining Company (Ash Creek) appealed the district court's ruling that
the parties lacked standing to object to the Secretary's completed exchange of federally owned coal for theJY Ranch conservation easement.
Laurance S. Rockefeller owned the JY Ranch located within Grand
Teton National Park, Wyoming. In 1985, Rockefeller negotiated with
the Department of the Interior for the exchange of a conservation easement of 1106.49 acres within the ranch for 2560 acres of federally
119. Id. at 254.
120. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2136 n.l.
121. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 38, 43.
124. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. at 2137.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky
Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 44-45 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505
(1975)).

128. 969 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1992).
129. 969 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1992).
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owned coal in Sheridan County, Wyoming.' 3 0 In 1987, Rockefeller
donated the conservation easement to a non-profit organization, the
Sloan-Kettering Institute for Cancer Research (Institute).131 The Bureau of Land Management (BLM) prepared an environmental assessment of the proposed exchange and concluded an environmental impact
statement was unnecessary. Subsequently, the BLM published a notice
in the Federal Register detailing the proposed exchange. 13 2 The State
and Ash Creek filed protests to the exchange.13 3 Ash Creek, a coal company owned by Public Service Company of Oklahoma, owned a 160-acre
fee coal tract adjacent to portions of the Sheridan County coal offered in
owner of roughly seventy acres overlying
exchange and was the surface
13 4
the federally owned coal.
On May 11, 1990, the day after the Institute conveyed the conservation easement to the United States, the Department of the Interior dismissed the complaints filed by the State and Ash Creek. 35 The BLM
then issued a patent to the Sheridan County coal to the Institute, which
136
subsequently sold the rights to Reserve Coal Properties Company.
Two months later, the State filed a four-count complaint in federal
district court against the Secretary, the Department of Interior, Rockefeller, the Institute and Reserve Coal Properties Company.1 37 The complaint sought judicial review of the Secretary's action and challenged its
38
validity based on the Federal Land Policy Management Act (FLPMA)1
and the Secretary's failure to act in the public interest, failure to ensure
the parity of the value of the exchanged parcels and failure to follow
BLM internal procedure. The final count challenged the Secretary's exchange under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 139 on the
grounds of an inadequate environmental assessment and lack of environmental impact statement.1 40 The State alleged the Secretary deprived the State of revenues because the exchange removed coal from
the competitive leasing system, under which the Mineral Leasing Act
42
(MLA) 14 1 entitles the state to recover royalty payments.'
On August 21, 1990, Ash Creek filed a complaint in federal district
court against the same five parties seeking judicial review of the Secretary's action and requesting invalidation of the exchange.14 3 The impetus of Ash Creek's complaint was an interest in acquiring the exchanged
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 870; Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 879.
Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 879.
Id.
Id.; Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 871.
Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 871.
Id
Id
Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 879.
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(c) (1988 & Supp. 11 1991).
Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 879-80.
30 U.S.C. §§ 181-287 (1988 & Supp. H 1991).
Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880.
Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 871.
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federal coal through the competitive leasing process.144 The Ash Creek
complaint challenged the Secretary's action under FLPMA, NEPA, MLA
and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)145 .
All defendants successfully moved to dismiss both the State's and
Ash Creek's complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.' 4 6 The district court noted in both cases that the State and
Ash Creek lacked standing to challenge the exchange because the alleged injuries could not be redressed by any conceivable court remedy. 14 7 Rather, both claimants requested judicial reversal of the
Secretary's exchange to dispose of the Sheridan County coal through
the competitive leasing system. Ash Creek wished to acquire the coal 148
and the State of Wyoming desired the accompanying royalty revenues. 14 9 However, the district court noted that the Secretary has discretion with regard to decisions to dispose of the coal through the
competitive leasing system. The possibility Ash Creek would acquire
the coal was indefinite, 150 as was the potential of the lease producing
royalty revenues for the State. 151 The lower court further noted that the
State lacked standing under the NEPA claim because the State was not
52
within the zone of interest protected by the statute. 1
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Circuit Judge Ruggero J. Aldisert15 3 wrote two nearly identical opinions affirming the district court
and dismissing the State and Ash Creek on standing grounds. After
deftly summarizing current standing doctrine, 15 4 Judge Aldisert criticized both parties for failing to present injuries redressable by judicial
remedy.
Although the State asserted a colorable injury in fact regarding the
deprivation of royalty revenues, the court stated the "case is a conjecture based on speculation that is bottomed on surmise. It ostensibly
asserts public policy concerns, but on final analysis, the State's interest
begins and ends with the royalties it expected to receive had the Secretary chosen to offer the coal for competitive leasing."' 155 In an incredulous tone, Judge Aldisert worked through the logic of the State's
144. Id.
145. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-590 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
146. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 872.; Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880. Rule 12(b)(6) states:
(b) How Presented. Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any
pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall
be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except that the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by motion: . . .
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
147. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 872; Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880.
148. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 871-72.
149. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880.
150. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 872.
151. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880.
152. Id.
153. Ruggero J. Aldisert, Senior Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit, sitting by designation. Id. at 878.
154. Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 874-75; Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 880-81.
155. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 882.
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argument, pausing to express disbelief at the sheer impossibility of a
ruling favorable to the State that would redress the asserted injury of
lost royalty revenues: "A favorable ruling in this case will not guarantee
the State one nickel of coal leasing royalties from these lands."' 15 6 The
court pointed out the federal judiciary is powerless to order the Secre15 7
tary to release federally owned coal through competitive leasing.
The court also dismissed the State's FLPMA claim regarding the Secretary's alleged failure to adequately consider the interests of state and
local people on the grounds the State's complaint fell outside the zone
of interests protected by FLPMA. 158
Ash Creek fared no better. The court initially criticized the "vagueness and lack of focus in Ash Creek's opening brief"' 159 and then analyzed Ash Creek's standing based on two injuries allegedly caused by the
exchange: Ash Creek's lost opportunity to participate in competitive
coal leasing; and hinderance of its surface ownership rights to lands
overlying the exchanged coal. 160 Judge Aldisert dismissed Ash Creek's
first asserted injury on the grounds the loss of the possibility of leasing
the coal was an injury not redressable by judicial decision and that Ash
Creek thereby lacked standing. 16 1 Ash Creek contended mining of the
exchanged coal would adversely impact Ash Creek economically. Apparently the company had stockpiled a huge quantity of overburden on
lands overlying the federal coal deposits exchanged for the conservation
easement. Overburden is the waste product of the strip mining process.
In essence, Ash Creek maintained that its surface ownership, adjacent
coal mine and use of the tract at issue as a refuse pile for hundreds of
thousands of cubic yards of overburden prevented the Secretary from
leasing or exchanging the coal to any party besides Ash Creek. 16 2 In
scalding language, the court ruled:
To state this argument in these simple terms devoid of the
obfuscation and confusion set forth in Ash Creek's written and
oral arguments is to expose the futility, and fatality, of the argument. Ash Creek has not demonstrated a substantial nexus between the relief requested and the elimination of its injuries.
No court can fashion an order redressing these alleged injuries
because no court has the power to vest Ash Creek with mining
rights to the exchanged coal lands or to prevent any other coal
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operator from possessing them.'
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court and held Ash
Creek lacked standing to challenge the exchange of the coal for the conservation easement. 164
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 882-83.
Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 873.
Id. at 873-74.
Id. at 874.
Id. at 876.
Id.
Id.
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C. Analysis
After Ash Creek and Sullivan, parties claiming an injury from proposed or completed public lands exchanges must demonstrate with
specificity all three elements of standing or risk denial of federal jurisdiction. As parties indirectly affected by the exchange of the coal for the
conservation easement, Ash Creek and the State demonstrated Judge
Scalia's maxim set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: "[W]hen the
plaintiff is not himself the object of the government action or inaction he
challenges, standing is not precluded, but is ordinarily 'substantially
more difficult' to establish."' 165 Ash Creek and Sullivan demonstrate that
"substantially more difficult" should read "nearly impossible."
Although both the State and Ash Creek were so aggrieved by the
Secretary's action to pursue litigation in federal court, their injuries
were ultimately peripheral to the challenged exchange. The Tenth Circuit focused almost exclusively on the consequences of a ruling
favorable to the plaintiffs and held the attenuated chain of causation between the coal exchange and the claimant's alleged injuries prevented
66
their direct and sure redressability. 1
When establishing standing to invoke federal jurisdiction, parties
must draft pleadings and frame the requested relief with care. An actual
or perceived injury that may be relieved in some way, even favorably, by
judicial remedy may not support standing.' 6 7 Although court action
may plausibly alleviate an aggrieved and injured party, the substance of
standing supporting federal jurisdiction may dissolve for lack of causation or redressability. Rather, the alleged injury must be both directly
caused by the defendant's action or inaction and capable of definite redress through court action. When causation of the injury in fact is traceable directly to the challenged action or inaction, in a singular and
demonstrable cause and effect relationship, adequate redressability may
exist. However, an injury in fact arising from a multilinked chain of
cause and effect is nearly per se invalid to support federal jurisdiction.
Causation and redressability are obverse aspects of injury in fact. Injury
implies causation, which in turn bears on remedial benefit. Obviously, a
judicial remedy directed to actions that have not caused the injury at
68
issue can in no way alleviate that injury.'
CONCLUSION

In Doheny, the Tenth Circuit ruled balancing in-kind is the preferred
remedy for production imbalances. The opinion comports with case law
from other jurisdictions and factors a doctrine into oil and gas law that
encourages parties to deliver gas to the marketplace. In Cheyenne-Arapaho Tribes, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the Secretary of the Interior
165. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1992)(quoting Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984)).

166. Sullivan, 969 F.2d at 882; Ash Creek, 969 F.2d at 876.
167. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 43 (1976).
168. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 114, § 3531.4.
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must act as a fiduciary to Indians regarding mineral leasing on tribal
lands held in trust. The government may satisfy its fiduciary obligations,
however, by constructing a contemporaneous record that merely considers the Indians' economic best interest. Finally, as demonstrated in Ash
Creek Mining Co. and State ex rel. Sullivan, the Tenth Circuit does not hesitate to invoke standing doctrine to deny federal jurisdiction to challengers indirectly harmed by Department of Interior public lands exchanges.
EzekielJ. Williams

